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FRANCE AND THE COMMUNITY OF SIX:
THE SCHUMAN DECLARATION TO THE TREATIES OF ROME

Daniel A. Gagnon
Providence College
Spring 2015

The European Union is one of the world’s most important economic and political
institutions. As of 2014, the EU has a larger economy than the United States of America and has
more than 500 million citizens.1 The process of constructing a united Europe began during the
1950s with the creation of the three European Communities: the Coal and Steel Community, the
Atomic Energy Community, and the Economic Community. The member-states of these
Communities delegated their sovereignty over certain policy areas to the Communities’
institutions, therefore making the Communities supranational in nature.
The French government and leading French citizens, most notably Jean Monnet and
Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, were instrumental in the creation of the Communities. These
visionary Frenchmen overcame skepticism from both within France and from the rest of Europe,
and caused Europe to take the first steps towards unification. It was Monnet and Schuman who
proposed the first Community, the Coal and Steel Community. These two Frenchmen strongly
believed in supranational integration, the delegating of sovereign powers to central European
institutions, rather than mere intergovernmental co-operation between the independent states of
Europe. The Communities partially integrated the member-states, and the institutions which
governed the Community remain in the governing structure of the contemporary European
Union.

The Schuman Declaration, 1950
Robert Schuman was Prime Minister of France from November, 1947, to July, 1948, and
then again for a week during September, 1948. He was a member of the National Assembly from
1
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the French border region of Alsace-Lorraine, but was born in neighboring Luxembourg. He did
not become a French citizen until 1919, after the region of Alsace-Lorraine was returned to
France by the Treaty of Versailles. Schuman was a member of Paul Reynaud’s government in
the spring of 1940 when Germany invaded France. After the Fall of France, Schuman was jailed
by the Nazis and later served in the resistance in the unoccupied zone. He was a strong supporter
of Franco-German reconciliation and of European integration, and advocated for both as Foreign
Minister of France from July, 1948, until January, 1953.
Schuman worked hard after the war to reach an understanding between France and
Germany. As someone from the border region between the two nations, he was seen as being the
perfect man for the task. He told the National Assembly in 1949, “if I find myself occupying this
position [of Foreign Minister], it is not because I have sought it but doubtless because someone
from France’s eastern frontier was needed to try and achieve peaceful co-existence between the
two countries.”2 Schuman agreed with Monnet, Georges Bidault, and others that Germany must
be welcomed back into the community of free nations on a fairly equal footing with the other
nations of Europe.
The German question was the dominant issue facing the Allies in the late 1940s and early
1950s. At the Allied foreign ministers meeting in September, 1949, American Secretary of State
Dean Acheson asked Schuman to submit a proposal to resolve the German question at their next
meeting in May, 1950. Schuman did not have any concrete proposals in mind, and conferred
with Monnet and others on this important issue. In January, 1950, Monnet wrote a letter to
Schuman in which he outlines the importance of reconciliation and equality with Germany in
order to reach a permanent solution, “peace can be founded only on equality, we failed in 1919
2
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because we introduced discrimination and a sense of superiority, now we are beginning to make
the same mistake again.”3 The French Government followed this policy of bringing about greater
equality between France and the occupied Germans, at least to a degree that prevented a
resurgent Germany.
In April, 1950, Monnet, along with Paul Reuter, the legal advisor to the French Foreign
Ministry, and Étienne Hirsch, a longtime associate of Monnet who later became President of the
Euratom Commission, wrote a memorandum to Schuman, the French Foreign Minister at the
time.4 The memorandum proposed that the French and German coal and steel industries should
be merged and subjected to a supranational ‘High Authority’ under which both nations were to
be treated as equals. A similar proposal was made several years before by Paul Reynaud to the
intergovernmental Council of Europe but that proposal went nowhere, which reinforced the view
among federalists that the Council of Europe was not the organization upon which a European
federation could be built.5
Monnet’s proposal to Schuman made both political as well as economic sense for France
and Europe. Politically it would remove the industrial restrictions on Germany, and resolve the
issue of controlling the industrial potential of the Saar and Ruhr. Also, France and Germany were
treated equally under the plan, something the Germans greatly desired. Additionally, with the
heavy industries of the two nations intertwined, the risk of future wars diminished greatly. Most
importantly, the supranational institutions proposed in the memorandum were the first step
towards an eventual European federation.
3
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Economically, France had the most to gain from this initiative. It was feared that if
Germany regained control over its coal resources in the Saar and Ruhr these resources would be
directed primarily to German industry. Since there was only a finite amount of coal, less would
be transported to France which relied on German coal to power its own domestic industry. If the
flow of coal to France stopped or diminished, it would greatly jeopardize Monnet’s Economic
Modernization Plan, which was so far very successful in rebuilding French industry. The
proposed pooling of resources, however, would ensure that both French and German industries
were treated equally, and so maintain the flow of coal to French industry.
Monnet’s proposal was delivered to Schuman by his directeur de cabinet, Bernard
Clappier, just before Schuman’s train left the Gare de l’Est headed for Metz, where he spent the
weekend. Upon his return to Paris the following Monday, Schuman told Monnet that he agreed
with the proposal, and the two Frenchmen drafted what became the Schuman Declaration.
Although Monnet initiated this proposal, Schuman was essential for bringing about the political
will for its implementation. Monnet also sent his proposal to Prime Minister Georges Bidault, but
never received a response. Schuman, however, devoted himself entirely to the plan’s
implementation. Monnet writes about the great step Schuman took by endorsing this plan, “the
fact is there was no Bidault Plan, but a Schuman Plan.”6 Without Schuman’s support, Monnet’s
proposal had no chance of success.
Before the plan was publicly announced, the French Government needed to ensure that
the German Government was in agreement. On May 8, 1950, Schuman sent a messenger to
Chancellor Adenauer in Bonn with the Declaration and a personal letter explaining the proposals.
In the letter, Schuman referenced Adenauer’s previous comments to the journalist Joseph
6
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Kingsbury-Smith in which Adenauer advocated for a Franco-German union. Adenauer was
immediately receptive to the proposal and understood it had far-reaching economic and political
implications. Adenauer recalls this day in his memoirs, writing that he “informed Robert
Schuman at once that I accepted his proposal wholeheartedly.”7 Adenauer later told Monnet, “I
regard the implementation of the French proposal as my most important task. If I succeed, I
believe that my life will not have been wasted.”8 Although this project was an economic
proposal, its real significance was that it was the first step towards a united Europe. Adenauer
later said in a speech to the West German Bundestag, “the importance of this project is above all
political and not economic.”9 The Chancellor recognized that what Monnet and Schuman
proposed was not just industrial co-operation, but rather the first step on the path to supranational
European integration with the hope of an eventual European federation.
Schuman held a press conference the next day, May 9, 1950, in the famed Salon de
l’Horloge in the French Foreign Ministry at the Quai d’Orsay. This room, decorated in the
elaborate Second Empire style, was where the Paris Peace Conference convened in 1919.
Schuman delivered the Declaration to a gathered audience of the international press with Monnet
at his side. Schuman proposed “that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be
placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organization open to the
participation of the other countries of Europe.”10 The Declaration continues, “Europe will not be
7
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made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements
which first create a de facto solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the
elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken must in the first
place be between these two countries.”11 Finally, Schuman said that due to the proposed pooling
of coal and steel, “any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but
materially impossible.”12 Although the Schuman Plan facilitated Franco-German reconciliation,
it also laid the foundation for a future European federation, and thus Monnet hoped that many
other European nations would join the forthcoming organization. The Declaration encouraged
those who feared a resurgent Germany to support the Schuman Plan as a means to establish
peace and stability on the Continent.
After the Declaration was announced, Schuman attended a conference of the three Allied
foreign ministers in London from May 11 to May 13. The role of West Germany in the face of
the Soviet threat to Western Europe was the main topic of this conference, but the discussion
went quite differently than expected in light of the Schuman Declaration. Charles Ronsac, a
French journalist at the conference, writes, “the atmosphere, the orientation, the perspective have
all changed. In place of a negative Cold War conference, we are going to have a positive
conference, an attempt to economically organize Europe.”13 The Schuman Declaration changed
the way that European leaders looked at the postwar problems of Europe, and proposed the
creation of supranational institutions as a means to solve these problems.
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The European Coal and Steel Community
In May, 1950, the Schuman Declaration announced the French Government’s intention to
establish a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), a dream that was realized the
following year. The ECSC Treaty was drafted by an intergovernmental conference in Paris that
commenced in June, 1950. Monnet played a leading role in the negotiations and throughout the
conference he continually expounded the idea that key principle of the ECSC Treaty was the
delegation of sovereign powers to a central European institution for the first time, even though
the institution controlled only one area of the economy. Monnet writes in a letter at the time of
the Treaty negotiations, “the Schuman Proposals are revolutionary or they are nothing… The
Schuman Proposals provide the basis for the building of a new Europe through the concrete
achievement of a supranational régime.”14 The resulting ECSC Treaty established a
supranational institution that was very much in line with what Monnet and Schuman first
proposed in May, 1950.
The 1951 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community was signed and
ratified by France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. These nations
became known as ‘The Six’. The United Kingdom notably did not sign the Treaty; it was more
concerned with its Empire and its relationship to the United States, and was unwilling to delegate
its sovereignty to a Continental institution. Although Monnet desired British participation in a
united Europe, the proposals outlined in the Treaty were too important to allow Britain to water
them down. When asked in London by Sir Stafford Cripps whether the ECSC Treaty
negotiations would go on without British participation, Monnet replied, “we waited for you for a
decision when Hitler entered the Rhineland in 1936 and the results were disastrous. We shall not
14
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make that same mistake again.”15 François Duchêne, a political writer and advisor to Monnet, as
well as his biographer, described the British outlook, writing that they were “living in Paradise
Lost, rather than one to be gained.”16 Britain’s belief that it was still an imperial power prevented
it from joining any supranational institutions. For the time being, a united Europe was built
without Britain.
The ECSC Treaty’s preamble states, “Europe can be built only by concrete actions
which create a real solidarity and by the establishment of common bases for economic
development.”17 This was the only path that Monnet believed would lead to an eventual
federation. Article 4 of the Treaty banned customs duties and quotas on the import and export of
coal and steel among the member-states of the Community, which created the integrated
economy that Monnet and Marjolin desired. The governing structure of the ECSC was
supranational in nature, but also included intergovernmental elements. The ECSC was governed
by the supranational High Authority, the Court of Justice, the intergovernmental Council of
Ministers, and the Common Assembly made up of members of the national parliaments.
The most important and revolutionary aspect of the governing structure was the
supranational High Authority, which Monnet was chosen to lead as its first President. The High
Authority had nine total members, eight were chosen by collective decision of the national
governments, and the ninth was chosen by a decision of the initial eight members.18 The High
15
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Authority was truly supranational in nature, since its members represented the Community, and
not the national governments. Its functioning is described in Article 9 of the ECSC Treaty, which
states, “the members of the High Authority shall exercise their functions in complete
independence, in the general interest of the Community. In the fulfillment of their duties, they
shall neither solicit nor accept instructions from any government or from any organization. They
will abstain from all conduct incompatible with the supranational character of their functions.”19
The members of the High Authority swore an oath to respect their role as defined in the Treaty
upon taking office. The role of the member-states was also defined in the Treaty, “each member
State agrees to respect this supranational character and to make no effort to influence the
members of the High Authority in the execution of their duties.” 20 The High Authority was the
first European institution that partially exercised the delegated sovereignty of the member-states
and was independent of the national governments.
In addition to the High Authority, the other key governing body was the Council of
Ministers, where the national governments were represented. Its membership was made up of
either the industry or economy ministers from the national governments and had the power to
block the initiatives of the High Authority. Monnet’s plan originally did not include a Council of
Ministers, since it was intergovernmental and not supranational in nature. Professor Hallstein,
leader of the German delegation at the Treaty negotiations, “strongly agreed” with Monnet that
the entire organization should be supranational.21 This was because, in Monnet’s words, “the
supranational Authority is not merely the best means for solving economic problems: it is also
19
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the first move towards a federation.”22 Any intergovernmental part of the institution was likely to
protect the power of the national governments and inhibit progress towards a European
federation.
However, not all the other negotiators agreed with Monnet and the federalists that the
organization should be entirely supranational, and the Council of Ministers was added to the
Treaty to appease these skeptical delegates. Dirk Spierenburg, the Dutch negotiator, along with
the representatives of Belgium and Luxembourg, argued for this inclusion of the Council of
Ministers. At the first meeting of the Council, Adenauer, whose nation held the revolving
presidency, described its role, “the Council stands at the crossroads of two kinds of sovereignty:
national and supranational.”23 The Council went on to be an important player in the process of
European integration and acted as a reassurance that the national governments still had a role in
making Community decisions. A modified version of the Council exists today in the present
governing structure of the European Union.
The lasting importance of the ECSC was twofold: it modernized and united, if only
partially, the European economy, and it laid the institutional foundation for future European
integration. Economically, it helped to rebuild European heavy industry that was destroyed by
the war. By 1953, the ECSC oversaw “resources to a value of 5 to 6 milliard [billion] dollars per
annum, representing 15% of [the member-states’] industrial output; industries which, by
employing more than 1,750,000 persons, provide work for one out of ten of their working
population; products which, up to an output of 300 million tons, represent more than 40% of the
22
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total tonnage transported within the Community.”24 Likewise, the ECSC had a successful record
of growing the industries which it oversaw, and was particularly successful in increasing the
trade of coal and steel between The Six. According to Monnet, by 1953 the transport of coal
between the member states increased 300 fold, amounting to roughly 400,000 tons a month and
the transport of iron ore from France to Belgium and Luxembourg increased 150 fold, amounting
to roughly 200,000 tons a month.25 This economic success continued, with steel production in
the Community nearly doubling between 1953 and 1961, and the Community overtook the
United States in total coal and steel production by 1962.26
Politically, it was the first time that European nations partially delegated their sovereignty
to a supranational institution. The ECSC proved that supranational institutions could function
correctly, and in the following years national politicians increasingly began to support the idea of
creating new supranational institutions instead of intergovernmental ones, an idea for which
Monnet long advocated. The French National Assembly ratified the ECSC Treaty on December
13, 1951, by a wide margin of 377 votes to 233.27
But not all national politicians approved of a united Europe based on supranational
institutions. General de Gaulle, founder of the influential political party Rassemblement du
Peuple Français (RPF), was highly critical of the ECSC and described its central institutions as a
24
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“cabal.”28 But among those who advocated for further integration, the ECSC was a glowing
success. In a letter from April 18, 1951, the day the ECSC Treaty was signed, Schuman writes
that it was the dawning of “a new era in the relations between the participating countries and
represents a decisive phase on the way to European unity.”29 Hallstein, the head of the German
delegation at the Treaty negotiations, writes that the ECSC’s essential characteristics were that it
was “supranational, that it was practical, and that it was partial.”30 Although the ECSC was
important, more progress was required to realize the eventual goal of a European federation.

The Proposed European Defense Community
Before the negotiations on the ECSC Treaty concluded, the French Government proposed
The European Defense Community (EDC) as a way to further integrate Europe. This time the
European nations were asked to consider military integration, which was another effort to
prevent future wars on the Continent. Additionally, the EDC was a way to restore German armed
forces to help in the defense of the west against Soviet aggression.
West Germany was self-governing under Chancellor Adenauer, although it was still
denied the sovereign right to maintain armed forces by the Allied occupation authorities and was
not allowed to seek UN or NATO membership. But as Cold War tensions rose, views on German
re-armament changed. The Prague Putsch and the blockade of Berlin in 1948, followed by the
detonation of an atomic bomb by the Soviet Union in 1949, and finally the invasion of South
Korea by Communist forces on June 25, 1950, made France and its NATO allies realize how
28
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vulnerable they were to the Communist forces arrayed on the eastern half of their continent.
Parallels were seen between the invasion of western-backed South Korea by Communist North
Korea and the People’s Republic of China, and a possible invasion of unarmed West Germany
by East German and Soviet forces. Adenauer, the leader of West Germany, writes that he was
“firmly convinced that Stalin was planning the same procedure for Western Germany as had
been used in Korea.”31 The American Government agreed, and saw the need for Germany to rearm so it could help in the defense of Western Europe. At the September, 1950, meeting of the
Allied foreign ministers, the United States announced that it was willing to send additional
military forces to Western Europe, but on the condition that Germany was allowed to re-arm so it
could contribute to its own defense. The communiqué issued by the foreign ministers states that
they would further study “German participation in an integrated force for the defense of
European freedom.”32 They welcomed German armed forces to help defend Western Europe, but
on the condition that they were not under the independent command of the German Government.
German re-armament was a contentious issue for France, where memories of German
aggression were still fresh. Monnet suggested to Prime Minister René Pleven a plan in which
Germany would re-arm within the context of a supranational European Army, similar in structure
to the ECSC. Pleven was a former Minister of Defense, and as Prime Minister he fought to
ensure the ECSC Treaty was successfully ratified by the National Assembly. Pleven put the
proposal before the French cabinet, and it became known as the Pleven Plan. The Plan proposed
the creation of a European Ministry of Defense responsible to an assembly and a council of the
31
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national defense ministers, in a structure that mirrored that of the ECSC. This new supranational
Community would also control procurement and planning with war industries. Under the
umbrella of the European Army all national militaries would still be controlled by their national
governments, except for the German contingent which would be broken up and integrated into
units from the other member-states. Pleven announced this plan to the National Assembly in a
speech on October 24, 1950. The Assembly endorsed the plan in principle by a vote of 343 to
220.33 However, the Plan initially received little support from France’s NATO allies. General
Dwight Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, said that the Pleven Plan
presented “every kind of obstacle, difficulty, and fantastic notion that misguided humans could
put into one package.”34 Questions were raised about the Plan’s compatibility with the existing
structure of the Atlantic Alliance.
Although the Cold War situation precipitated the Pleven Plan, it was far more significant
than a simple a Cold War military measure. It was another attempt at European integration, this
time in the military sphere. Schuman reinforced this belief during the negotiations of the EDC
Treaty, saying, “what we want is not an improvisation imposed on us by immediate necessity.
The work we seek to create will not be limited by time. It must become a durable structure, the
expression of a European Community that has at last been founded.”35 Adenauer expresses the
same view in his memoirs, “the Pleven Plan was not an improvisation. It was the desire of the
French Government that the European governments should achieve agreement on a permanent
33
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and lasting institution.”36 A conference, similar to the Schuman Plan Conference, was called in
Paris to formulate the EDC Treaty.
The EDC Conference convened in Paris on February 15, 1951. Schuman announced to
the other delegations that the French Government was “convinced that Europe cannot be brought
to life at once like a Utopia. It will come about slowly. It is already in process of evolution piece
by piece and step by step.”37 He further said of the EDC proposal, “within the framework of
Atlantic armed forces there will be a European Army as a permanent instrument of the security
of our continent and as an essential element of European integration.”38 The draft EDC Treaty
also emphasizes the integrationist aims of the proposed institution. Article 38 of the Treaty
declares that the EDC would be another step towards a future “federal or confederal structure.”39
Several nations attending the conference remained skeptical of the initial Pleven Plan, and
certain provisions were modified.
One modification was that the power of the proposed Ministry of Defense was weakened,
and therefore the supranational aspect was limited. Due to objections from the Benelux nations
the proposed single Minister of Defense was replaced with a committee. But the most important
modification was the chain-of-command. The original Pleven Plan was modified to be more
compatible with NATO, and the proposed European Army was placed under the direct control of
the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, who was, and would always continue to be, an
36
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American. This was articulated in Article 18.1 of the EDC Treaty, which states, “the competent
Supreme Commander responsible to NATO is empowered… to ensure that the European
Defense Forces are organized, equipped, instructed, and prepared in a satisfactory way.” 40 This
subordination of the proposed European Army to an American commander was one of the
factors that prohibited the ratification of the Treaty, as the EDC’s European identity was lost.
All six member-states of the ECSC signed the EDC Treaty on May 25, 1952. But
ultimately, although it was the French Government who originally proposed the creation of the
EDC, it was the French Government which failed to have the Treaty ratified. After the previous
legislative elections in June, 1951, the French political landscape changed greatly. In these
elections the Gaullist RPF party received the most seats in the Assembly, with 120, and the
Communists won the popular vote and received 100 seats.41 Both groups opposed the EDC
Treaty, while the Socialists under Guy Mollet were split on the issue. Prime Minister Antoine
Pinay, a supporter of the EDC, lost a vote of confidence soon before he was to introduce the
Treaty to the Assembly. Several governments later, Pierre Mendès-France became Prime
Minister and brought the Treaty to the Assembly in August, 1954. In this government Robert
Schuman was replaced as Foreign Minister by Georges Bidault, after having held the post since
1948. Both Mendès-France and Bidault opposed the EDC Treaty as it was written.42
Mendès-France went to Brussels on August 23, 1954, in order to try and persuade the
other member states to agree on modifications to the EDC Treaty. It was clear that the Treaty had
no chance of ratification in the National Assembly without modifications. One of Mendès40
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France’s proposals was to restrict the Treaty so it only applied to units stationed in Germany.43
The meetings lasted until the early morning of August 24, but he failed to achieve any
concessions. At the subsequent press conference he refused to announce how he would vote
when the Treaty was put before the National Assembly.44
On August 30, 1954, the Treaty was rejected by the National Assembly with 319 votes
against the Treaty and 264 votes for.45 The Gaullists and Communists opposed the Treaty, and
the Socialists split 50 in favor and 53 against.46 The Treaty failed despite vocal support for it in
the Assembly from Robert Schuman, leader of the Christian-democratic Mouvement Républicain
Populaire (MRP).47 The debate was contentious, and the reaction to the vote was almost riotous
with shouts from the benches of the far-left and far-right. After the results were announced, the
deputies who voted against the Treaty sang the Marseillaise in the Hémicycle of the Palais
Bourbon, while the delegates in the center who supported the Treaty left the chamber.
Each party that opposed the Treaty did so for different reasons. The Socialists split with
half supporting and half opposing the Treaty because the European dimension of the Treaty was
lost during the revisions of the original Pleven Plan, which now placed the entire EDC under the
command of an American. The Communists voted against the Treaty because they were antiNATO by definition. The Gaullists opposed the Treaty because, along with members of the far43
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right, they opposed delegating French sovereignty to European institutions. General de Gaulle
was appalled at the prospect of surrendering the sovereignty of the French armed forces,
especially to the Americans. In his memoirs he writes that the EDC Treaty meant “handing over
the command of this stateless assemblage lock, stock, and barrel to the United States of
America.”48 Subjecting the EDC to an American commander went against the Gaullist view of
European integration, which advocated for a strong Europe as a ‘Third Force’ between the
United States and the Soviet Union.
Although General Eisenhower criticized the original Pleven Plan, the American
Government strongly supported the revisions that made the EDC subordinate to NATO. John
Foster Dulles, the American Secretary of State under now-President Eisenhower, said of the
rejection of the Treaty, “it is a tragedy that in one country nationalism, abetted by Communism,
has asserted itself so as to endanger the whole of Europe.”49 The defeat of the Treaty also meant
that another agreement was necessary to allow for German re-armament.
The rejection of the EDC was a setback for the European integration movement, but it
was only temporary. In his memoirs, Monnet puts the rejection of the EDC in perspective by
contrasting it with the ECSC, “coal and steel had been supreme for only a century: the army, on
the other hand, had immemorial traditions. Its symbols were the flag and uniform: both were
regarded as sacred.”50 France was unwilling to relinquish sovereignty over the armed forces,
particularly to the Americans, but it was willing to continue integration in other policy areas.
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Monnet left office as President of the High Authority of the ECSC on June 3, 1955. He
was replaced by fellow Frenchman René Mayer, a former Prime Minister and a strong supporter
of the Community. Monnet announced his decision not to seek another term as President soon
after the defeat of the EDC Treaty. His decision surprised many members of the High Authority
because Monnet was the embodiment of the ECSC and of supranational integration in general. It
was he who proposed the ECSC to Schuman and led the negotiations that drafted the Treaty.
Edmond Wellenstein, the Secretary of the High Authority from the Netherlands, said of Monnet,
“he was the High Authority,” and likewise, Albert Coppé, the Belgian Vice President of the High
Authority, described Monnet as “the personification of the High Authority.”51
Monnet chose to leave because he believed he could do more to accomplish further
European integration without the responsibilities of public office. He told the Common
Assembly of the ECSC that he resigned “in order that I may have complete freedom of action
and of expression in helping to achieve European unity – a real and concrete unity.”52 Monnet
went on to establish the Action Committee for the United States of Europe. The Committee
brought together trade union and political leaders from all the Community member-states.
Almost every political party in the Community was represented except for the Gaullists,
Communists, and the Italian Socialists under the leadership of Pietro Nenni.53
At the time of his departure, Monnet believed that European integration was progressing.
Although the EDC Treaty failed, the proper functioning of the ECSC proved that supranational
integration was possible. Monnet described the ECSC in a speech to the National Press Club in
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Washington, DC, before he was President of the High Authority, saying it was “a breach in the
citadel of national sovereignty which bars the route to the unity of Europe.”54 This breach
continued to widen for the rest of the decade and culminated in 1957 with the Treaties of Rome
that established the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy
Community (Euratom). These two Communities were yet further advances in supranational
integration.

The Treaties of Rome: Two New Communities
In the mid-1950s, the French Government desired an atomic energy treaty. The MendèsFrance government fell in February, 1955, and the new government under Edgar Faure was more
open to integration, but only slightly. Faure’s government had nine ministers who supported the
EDC, mostly Christian-democrats, and six ministers who opposed the EDC, mainly Gaullists.55
Faure demonstrated his support for supranational integration in a speech to the Assembly in
1955, announcing, “a true organization cannot be given too loose a formula, cannot become a
mere club or conference of ambassadors; if the term ‘supranationality’ is alarming, let us say that
nevertheless it must be given the power of decision.”56 Furthermore, in the elections of January
2, 1956, the Gaullists lost five-sixths of their seats in the Assembly, and the RPF party no longer
existed. Guy Mollet, the leader of the Socialist party, became Prime Minister and chose Robert
Marjolin as his technical adviser on European policy. Mollet had support from the center and the
left for his European policy, and from the right for his Algerian policy, and therefore presided
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over one of the strongest governments of the Fourth Republic. He used this strong position to
steer the French Government back towards the path of further integration.
France had large civil and military atomic ambitions and desired a European organization
for peaceful civilian atomic energy resources, particularly after the 1956 Suez Crisis which
showed that Europe was far too reliant on Middle Eastern oil. At the same time, the Benelux
nations and West Germany were interested in expanding European economic integration, which
began under the ECSC. These nations desired a European Economic Community to facilitate
trade for their manufactured goods. Marjolin, the economist and advisor to Mollet, advocated for
liberalized trade in a Common Market and believed that it would be very beneficial to France. In
1955 he described France as “the most protectionist country in western Europe,”57 and that
summer he wrote that for the future of French economic growth “it is necessary to integrate
[France] into a larger entity in which all trade restrictions will be progressively abolished; not
only quotas, but also customs duties.”58 Marjolin worked to rally support for the EEC in France,
at a time when it had few supporters.
On May 14, 1955, the Common Assembly passed a resolution asking for the foreign
ministers of The Six to “call one or several intergovernmental conferences to develop, with the
appropriate assistance from the institutions of the Community, the necessary treaty proposals to
achieve the next steps of European integration.”59 The foreign ministers of The Six responded at
their meeting in June, 1955, at Messina. They appointed Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium to lead a
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committee to investigate and make proposals for greater economic integration and for greater
integration in the field of atomic energy. The French members of the committee included Pierre
Uri, a close associate of Monnet, Robert Marjolin, another associate of Monnet’s, former
Secretary-General of the OEEC, and advisor to Prime Minister Mollet, and Félix Gaillard, who
later became the youngest Prime Minister in the history of France.60 The committee’s report was
written mainly by Uri.61 As to further economic integration, the Spaak Committee called for the
creation of a Common Market, with the gradual elimination of internal tariffs between The Six, a
common external tariff on goods imported from outside the Community, free movement of labor
and capital among The Six, and an institutional structure similar to that of the ECSC and led by a
Commission.62 The Committee also proposed integrating the civilian atomic energy industries of
The Six, but not integrating any traditional types of energy.
The Spaak Report was the basis for the subsequent intergovernmental conferences which
drafted the Treaties of Rome that established the EEC and Euratom. The bells atop the Capitoline
Hill tolled as the representatives of The Six signed the Treaties on March 25, 1957. After the
Treaties were signed, all eyes were on France for the ratification process, because the French
National Assembly previously caused the downfall of the EDC Treaty in 1954.
The negotiators had France in mind when they drafted the Rome Treaties, especially the
EEC Treaty. The institutions created for the two new Communities were on the same basis as the
institutions of the ECSC. But, the Treaties intentionally avoided the terms “supranational,”
“High Authority,” and “federal” so as to avoid the impression that The Six were forfeiting too
60
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much sovereignty – the fear that previously doomed the EDC Treaty in the National Assembly.
In place of a “High Authority” there was a Commission to govern each Community, and the two
new Communities shared the Parliamentary Assembly (formerly the Common Assembly) and
the Court of Justice with the ECSC. However, the executives and the Councils of Ministers of
the three Communities were separate. Additionally, the Councils of Ministers of the two new
Communities had slightly expanded oversight powers to give the national governments more
control over the institutions.
France received additional concessions in the form of an association agreement between
the EEC and France’s former African colonies. Initially, the dependent territories of The Six
were not expected to be included in the agreement, but France insisted. France had the most to
gain from this association agreement because 98% of the population of the overseas territories
included in the agreement lived in the former French West Africa, the former French Equatorial
Africa, the former Belgian Congo, Madagascar, and the former Italian Somaliland.63 The former
French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, and Madagascar made up the overwhelming
majority of these territories. These areas gained commercial privileges and development aid from
the EEC. Crucially, the Community centrally administered the development aid to these
territories. This was more appealing to the leaders of the newly-independent African states, who
had difficulty accepting development aid directly from their former colonial masters.
At home, Marjolin succeeded in gaining support for the EEC from the French farmers,
who were the main constituents for center-right politicians and therefore helped assure the
Treaties’ ratification. In Paris, both Prime Minister Guy Mollet and Foreign Minister Christian
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Pineau supported the Rome Treaties, but former Prime Minister Mendès-France, who previously
opposed the EDC Treaty, did not.64
The EEC Treaty was ratified by all the legislatures of The Six, including the French
National Assembly on August 2, 1957. The Treaty entered into effect on January 1, 1958, along
with the Euratom Treaty whose ratification was also successful. Professor Hallstein of Germany
became President of the EEC Commission, the most prestigious office in the structure of the
three Communities. Marjolin was one of the two French representatives on the EEC
Commission. He was responsible for economics and finance, and served as Vice President of the
Commission until January, 1967.

Conclusion
In the first decade and a half after the Second World War, important progress was made
towards European integration with the goal of an eventual federation. It was the French
Government that proposed the first Community, it was France that prevented the creation of the
EDC, and it was France that proposed Euratom and was influential in the drafting of the EEC
Treaty. No one contributed more to this effort than Jean Monnet. President Kennedy, in a letter
written just before his assassination, said of Monnet, “under your inspiration, Europe has moved
closer to unity in less than twenty years than it had done before in a thousand. You and your
associates have built with the mortar of reason and the brick of economic and political interest.
You are transforming Europe by the power of a constructive idea.”65 In his memoirs, Monnet
reflects back on this period of great change and progress, “looking back at that midcentury
period one can hardly fail to be struck by the extraordinary ferment in men’s minds about the
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idea of European unity. The political parties and militant organizations dealt with it in their
manifestoes; statesmen discussed it in their speeches; articles were devoted to it in the press. The
London Times and The Economist published admirable editorials worthy of Jay’s, Madison’s,
and Hamilton’s Federalist Papers.”66 Monnet was the leader and greatest contributor to
European integration during this era.
Although the process of European unification was far from finished, great strides were
made during the postwar years. The formation of the three Communities demonstrated that the
nations of Western Europe were capable of delegating their sovereignty to central institutions, as
Monnet and Schuman originally proposed. When describing his measure of success for the
process of European integration in 1953, Monnet stated that success “is whether an authority
created freely by six nations divided for so many centuries by their national sovereignty can take
its decisions in the interest of these six nations, and then have its decisions carried out by the
enterprises of the nations. For the first time in centuries, Europe is doing just that.”67
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This paper was adapted from a section of my senior thesis that I wrote this past summer,
and I drew upon many of the Phillips Memorial Library’s resources during my research.
Although I lived at home during the summer, I made several trips to PC to use the library and
would not have been able to write my thesis without the resources available there.
As to the secondary sources I used, all of them came from either HELIN or InRhode. I
also read many other secondary sources from the library that I did not cite in my final paper in
order to gain a better understanding of the historical context of European integration.
I was very fortunate when it came to the availability of primary sources. At first I thought
that this would pose a problem, as I did not expect many to be readily available online. However,
when I was writing my thesis proposal last spring I met several times with different librarians at
the research desk and was able to find several online collections, most notably the University of
Pittsburgh’s Archive of European Integration. This is where I found many speeches, newspaper
articles, and government documents cited in my paper.
Once I discovered the University of Pittsburgh collection, I looked into whether or not
the EU had an official database of treaties, and this is how I came across the “Europa.eu”
database where I found important documents such as the Schuman Declaration. Similarly, I
explored the website of the French National Assembly and was able to find some transcripts of
the Assembly debates that helped to shed light on the positions of many French political leaders
in regards to European integration. Fortunately, I am able to read French and could translate
documents from this website, as well as from the University of Pittsburgh collection, for use in
my paper.
In addition to documents, I came across many memoirs and other works written by those
who were part of the process of European integration. Like the secondary sources, many of these
came from HELIN and the library at PC. There was only one of these books that I could not find
in HELIN or InRhode, the memoirs of Robert Marjolin, and that’s because in all of New England
there was only one copy of this book in a library. With this in mind, I was very fortunate that the
rest of the books I needed were so easy to access through the library.
Overall my research was very successful and I was able to base my paper almost entirely
on primary sources written in both French and English. These sources are from those who were
directly involved in the process of creating the Communities, such as Monnet and Schuman,
from those who were outside observers such as Beloff and Ronsac, and from those who opposed
European integration such as General de Gaulle. These primary sources from disparate
perspectives help to show the significance of the events, and also counter-act possible biases that
may be present in some of the memoirs. Finally, the secondary sources allowed me to frame the
events in the proper post-war and Cold War contexts.
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